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A B S T R A C T
Recent studies on involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) in daily life have shown that they are most
frequently reported during daily routines (e.g. while ironing). Such studies have suggested that reporting IAMs
may be inﬂuenced by the level of the ongoing task demands and availability of cognitive resources.
In two studies, we investigated the eﬀects of cognitive load on reporting IAMs. To examine the presumed
cognitive load dependency of IAMs, we utilised an often-employed experimental paradigm (Schlagman &
Kvavilashvili, 2008) to elicit IAMs under conditions that diﬀered in cognitive load. When performing a vigilance
task, participants had to interrupt the task each time they experienced any spontaneous mental contents and
write them down. We manipulated the level of cognitive load by either instructing (cognitive load group) or not
instructing (control group) participants to perform an additional demanding task.
We compared the groups on the number of IAMs and other mental contents (non-IAM contents) recorded, as
well as on the frequency of IAMs that was calculated as a proportion of IAMs in all mental contents reported by
the participant. We expected that if reporting IAMs depends on the level of cognitive demands, then we should
observe lower frequency of IAMs in the cognitive load group compared to the control group.
Consistently across studies, we observed a lower number of IAMs and non-IAM contents in the cognitive load
group. However, IAMs unexpectedly constituted a higher percentage of all mental contents when participants
were cognitively loaded. Further implications of the cognitive load eﬀects for IAMs research and experimental
methodology are discussed.
1. Introduction
Involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) come to mind
without any conscious attempt at retrieval (Berntsen, 2010; Mace,
2007), and appear to be retrieved eﬀortlessly in a non-strategic way
(e.g. Uzer, Lee, & Brown, 2012). They are distinct from voluntary
memories that are the result of an intention to retrieve a memory and
typically, although not always (see Barzykowski & Staugaard, 2016,
2017; Uzer et al., 2012), involve an eﬀortful search (Botzung, Denkova,
Ciuciu, Scheiber, & Manning, 2008; Conway & Loveday, 2010).
While IAMs are presumed to be retrieved automatically, little is
known about their accompanying cognitive mechanisms (e.g. cognitive
load dependency). According to Berntsen (2009, p. 86), the question of
how and why IAMs come to mind may be considered as one of the most
intriguing issues in relation to understanding IAMs. Although there is a
growing body of research concerning cognitive load and involuntary
thoughts (e.g. Forster & Lavie, 2009; McKiernan, D'Angelo, Kaufman, &
Binder, 2006; Smallwood, Nind, & O'Connor, 2009) or intrusive mem-
ories (e.g. Krans, Langner, Reinecke, & Pearson, 2013; Nixon, Nehmy, &
Seymour, 2007), to the best of the authors' knowledge there are only
two studies that addressed the cognitive load dependency of IAMs (Ball,
2007; Vannucci, Pelagatti, Hanczakowski, Mazzoni, & Paccani, 2015).
Extending knowledge about the cognitive mechanisms that underlie
IAMs is an important step toward gaining insight into the nature and
functioning of memory processes and human cognition. For example,
involuntary memory processes may have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on emotion
regulation (e.g. Gross, 2001), mood, and well-being (e.g. Kvavilashvili
& Schlagman, 2011). They are also important in relation to identity
(Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2009) and mental disorders, such as depression
(Moulds & Krans, 2015; Watson, Berntsen, Kuyken, & Watkins, 2013) or
PTSD (Berntsen, 2015). The empirical examination of IAMs under well-
controlled experimental conditions may thus contribute to everyday
life. The aim of the present study was to compare the frequency with
which IAMs are reported during cognitively-demanding and cogni-
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tively-undemanding activities (Berntsen, 1998, 2009; Schlagman,
Kvavilashvili, & Schultz, 2007).1
1.1. Cognitive load dependency of reporting involuntary autobiographical
memories
Vannucci et al. (2015) pointed out that the issue of why IAMs come
to mind pertains to a broader question; namely, given that IAMs occur
automatically in response to incidental external and internal cues, why
are we not constantly ﬂooded by them in daily life? It is intriguing to
ask what keeps these spontaneous memories at bay and enables us to
carry on with our daily activities uninterrupted. The present paper
aimed to verify one possible answer to this question; namely, that
cognitive load related to many everyday activities may preclude re-
porting IAMs. IAMs should thus be reported more frequently in less
cognitively-demanding conditions compared to more demanding con-
ditions. This approach may be called the cognitive load dependency view
(also cognitive load hypothesis by Vannucci et al., 2015). The results of
existing studies on IAMs in which a naturalistic diary method was used
(e.g. Berntsen, 1996) are in accordance with this view. They have
shown that involuntary retrieval is more likely to be reported when
attention is diﬀuse (Berntsen, 1996, 2009), and the individual is en-
gaged in an automatic activity with low attention and cognitive re-
source demands (e.g. washing-up, walking, ironing). Also, results from
studies on task-unrelated thoughts have shown that their frequency
declines as cognitive load increases (McKiernan et al., 2006).
There may be several possible eﬀects of cognitive load on the fre-
quency of IAMs. Various eﬀects may operate simultaneously, and thus
the explanations proposed below are not mutually exclusive. First,
Berntsen (2009, p. 97) suggested that IAMs may be generated through
the same processes that are involved in monitoring and control of
cognitively-demanding activities. IAMs and control mechanisms may
thus compete for the same cognitive resources (see Mandler, 1994 for a
similar argument). More speciﬁcally, Schlagman and colleagues pro-
posed (Schlagman, Kliegel, Schulz, & Kvavilashvili, unpublished) that
the ongoing activity that requires cognitive control reduces the fre-
quency of IAMs by limiting the amount of working memory needed to
process them. Second, Kvavilashvili and Mandler (2004) suggested that
a diﬀuse state of attention induced by low cognitive load boosts the
likelihood of processing cues that may act as potential triggers for IAMs,
thereby enhancing spreading activation. Support to this idea comes
from several studies that indicate that the retrieval of IAMs relies
strongly on the priming and spreading activation mechanisms (e.g.
Barzykowski & Niedźwieńska, 2017; Mace, 2005). Third, Baird and
colleagues suggested (Baird, Smallwood, Fishman, Mrazek, & Schooler,
2013) that the participant's ability to monitor their ﬂux of awareness
and extract content of thoughts from the stream (including auto-
biographical contents) may be impaired by cognitively demanding
tasks. Lending support to this suggestion, they found that cognitive load
indeed undermined the ability to notice the content of thoughts. In a
similar vein, a recently published study by Barzykowski and Staugaard
(2017) suggests that any autobiographical memory needs to pass an
awareness threshold to reach one's consciousness and this threshold
may be modiﬁed by diﬀerent factors. One of the factors is the ex-
pectation that a memory will occur which results in monitoring the
stream of awareness more extensively. Barzykowski and Staugaard
(2017) demonstrated (for similar results see also Barzykowski &
Niedźwieńska, 2016; Vannucci, Batool, Pelagatti, & Mazzoni, 2014)
that when an individual expects memories to occur and monitors the
ﬂux of thoughts more thoroughly, IAMs are more likely to be retrieved.
Cognitive load related to the ongoing activity may be another factor
that inﬂuences the awareness threshold. It contrast to the expectations
that memories will appear, cognitive load should elevate the threshold.
Whatever processes are actually induced by cognitive load, all the
above explanations imply that reporting IAMs may be substantially
limited by the high level of the ongoing task demands.
A deﬁnite test of the cognitive load dependency of reporting IAMs
requires a study in which cognitive load is experimentally manipulated
during the retrieval of IAMs. Ball (2007, Experiment 2) was the ﬁrst
who manipulated cognitive load in a laboratory setting. As he himself
pointed out, the study was designed “to examine the role of attention in
the elicitation of involuntary autobiographical memories by using the
same word-association task under two diﬀerent attention conditions”
(Ball, 2007, p. 142).2 He expected that if IAMs are more likely to be
retrieved under low attention load, then they should be faster reported
in that condition compared to a condition of high attention load. He
found that involuntary memories were indeed more quickly elicited
under the condition of low cognitive load. This ﬁnding lent ﬁrst support
to the notion that IAMs are aﬀected by attention load. However, as Ball
(2007, Experiment 2) measured only the speed with which IAMs were
retrieved rather than the frequency of reporting them, his study did not
directly address the aforementioned need of testing the cognitive load
dependency of reporting IAMs.
A recent study by Vannucci et al. (2015) partially addressed the
need of such test. They employed an often-used experimental procedure
designed to elicit involuntary memories in the laboratory (Schlagman &
Kvavilashvili, 2008). The procedure is a modiﬁcation of the word-cue
method (Crovitz & Schiﬀman, 1974), in which participants are exposed
to short verbal phrases, some of which may incidentally trigger in-
voluntary memories. Vannucci et al. (2015) experimentally manipu-
lated the number of cues presented during the experimental session (i.e.
the frequency/rate with which verbal cues were presented) and inter-
preted this manipulation as leading to diﬀerent levels of cognitive load.
As a result of the experimental manipulation, there were three condi-
tions: (1) frequent cues (high cognitive load), (2) infrequent cues (low
cognitive load), and (3) infrequent cues, but with additional tasks in-
volving arithmetic operations (high cognitive load). As the authors
expected, more IAMs were reported by the participants in the low
cognitive load condition (infrequent cues) compared to the high cog-
nitive load conditions (frequent cues and infrequent cues with ar-
ithmetic operations). Vannucci et al. (2015, p. 1082) interpreted these
results as ‘unequivocal support for the cognitive load hypothesis’.
However, as their study “was designed to assess the eﬀects of changing
the cue frequency in the IAMs task” (Vannucci et al., 2015, p. 1079)
rather than the eﬀects of the direct manipulation of cognitive load, it
can be argued that they provided only partial support for this hypoth-
esis. As they manipulated the rate with which cues were presented,
their ﬁndings are more open to explanations that are not related to
cognitive load. For example, it may be speculated that slowing down
the presentation of cues would render IAMs more likely because it
would be easier for the participants to mentally time travel between
diﬀerent contexts and periods of time at a slower rate.
Therefore, the present study was designed to test the cognitive load
dependency of IAMs in a manner that would overcome limitations of
the interpretation of Vannucci et al. (2015) and Ball (2007, Experiment
2) ﬁndings. Most importantly, in order to directly manipulate cognitive
1 Please note that it is unclear whether cognitive load may inﬂuence the retrieval of
IAMs (e.g. forming and developing an involuntary autobiographical memory) or/and the
ability to extract autobiographical content from the stream of consciousness and report it
(i.e. post-retrieval processes). For this reason, throughout the present paper we decided to
use the term ‘reporting IAMs’ to refer to giving a verbal (e.g. written or spoken) account of
IAMs that one has experienced. The procedures employed in previous studies of IAMs
(including the present study) do not allow us to unequivocally distinguish between the
eﬀects of cognitive load on the retrieval and post-retrieval processes (see the General
Discussion section for a detailed explanation).
2 The word-association tasks involves the experimenter presenting a word to the par-
ticipant who must immediately provide the ﬁrst thought that comes to mind associated
with this word. Ball (2007) used the continuous word-association task that requires the
participant to provide an initial association/response and then to continue giving a new
association to each response that preceded it.
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load we used an additional task that participants were or were not
asked to perform (the cognitive load condition vs control condition).
The task was entirely unrelated to cues that may have acted as potential
triggers for IAMs. The use of the additional task enabled us to directly
control and measure the presumed diﬀerences in the level of cognitive
load between the conditions (see the next section for a more detailed
explanation). Furthermore, in contrast to Ball's study, we measured the
frequency of reporting IAMs rather than the speed with which were
retrieved.
1.2. The present study
We utilised an often-employed experimental methodology that al-
lows recording of IAMs under well-controlled conditions (Schlagman &
Kvavilashvili, 2008). In the basic version of this procedure (see
Barzykowski & Niedźwieńska, 2016, 2017; Barzykowski & Staugaard,
2016, 2017; Vannucci et al., 2014; Vannucci et al., 2015), participants
are engaged in an uninteresting, undemanding vigilance task. During
the task they are exposed to short verbal phrases, some of which may
incidentally trigger thoughts. Participants are instructed to write down
any mental contents that spontaneously occur during the vigilance task.
They have to interrupt the vigilance task every time they want to write
down such a thought. Finally, at the completion of the task, participants
are given their thought descriptions and asked to indicate which of
them were memories. The most substantial diﬀerence between the basic
procedure of capturing IAMs in the laboratory and the current proce-
dure was that, on each trial, we additionally displayed a square with a
random number in it. By instructing half the participants to perform an
additional task related to numbers displayed in squares, we were able to
directly manipulate the level of cognitive load between participants.
According to the cognitive load dependency view, the frequency of
IAMs should be inﬂuenced by an additional task, and thus we should
expect less frequent IAMs in the cognitive load condition (with the
additional task) compared to the control condition (without the addi-
tional task). Alternatively, if IAMs arise automatically at minimal cog-
nitive cost, the cognitive load condition and the control condition
should not diﬀer in the frequency of IAMs.
In contrast to Vannucci et al. (2015), we were able to measure the
level of performance on the additional task to control for the extent to
which participants were actually engaged in performing it. Therefore,
we were able to examine whether their engagement was high enough to
increase cognitive load. Although Vannucci et al. exposed participants
to simple arithmetic operations (e.g. 3 + 8 = 11) in one condition,
participants were told not to perform these operations. Vannucci et al.
(2015) assumed that participants would automatically read these for-
mulas, as typically happens with verbal cues, and would episodically
check their validity, thereby increasing cognitive load. While we may
agree with this reasoning, it is unknown to what extent participants
were indeed checking the validity of the arithmetic operations. In ad-
dition, we compared the conditions with and without the additional
task in terms of how participants perceived the task diﬃculty. There-
fore, we were able to examine whether the presumed diﬀerences in the
level of cognitive load between the conditions were reﬂected in sub-
jective ratings.
There was also a need to control for some other diﬀerences due to
the experimental between-subjects manipulation. It is worth asking
what a diﬀerence in the number of IAMs actually tells us about their
underlying processes. This question is especially important in relation
to the use of a dual-task paradigm. For example, the cognitive load
manipulation usually requires performing an additional, relatively de-
manding task which may strongly inﬂuence the amount of time parti-
cipants have for reporting any spontaneous thoughts or memories. As
participants in the control group do not have to spend time performing
the second task, they may simply have more time to write down their
thoughts. In contrast, the individuals in the cognitive load group are
able to either perform the second task or to report thoughts at a given
time. Also, being busy with the additional task may result in partici-
pants paying less attention to verbal phrases presented on the screen,
and thus being overall less exposed to such phrases compared to par-
ticipants in the control condition.
Both of these scenarios (i.e., having less time to write down spon-
taneous thoughts, and paying less attention to verbal cues) may sig-
niﬁcantly contribute to the decrease in the number of IAMs (and other
mental contents) reported in the cognitive load condition compared to
the control condition. In other words, the diﬀerences in the number of
reported IAMs between conditions may reﬂect not only the presumed
cognitive load dependency of IAMs but also those diﬀerences between
conditions that result from the speciﬁc experimental context related to
a dual-task paradigm. In order to minimize this risk, we calculated an
involuntary autobiographical memory density index (henceforth called an
IAMD index). We propose this index to be a measure of the proportion
of involuntary autobiographical memories to the total number of all
mental contents reported by a given individual. The higher the IAMD
index, the higher the proportion of memories in all reported mental
contents. IAMD index indicates the frequency of IAMs. For example, an
IAMD index of 0.40 means that 40% of all mental contents reported by
the participant were IAMs. The IAMD index can be the same for two
participants who recorded a diﬀerent number of IAMs because it takes
into account the participants' cognitive activity as a whole and the
speciﬁc experimental context related to a dual-task paradigm, i.e.
having more or less time to write down spontaneous thoughts and more
or less chance to notice thought triggers. The presumed cognitive load
dependency of reporting IAMs predicts lower IAMD index in the cog-
nitive load condition compared to the control condition. Alternatively,
if reporting IAMs occurs automatically at minimal cognitive cost, then
we should not observe diﬀerences between the control group and the
cognitively-loaded group on the IAMD index.
In addition, to evaluate the comparability of participants across the
experimental conditions, we asked a series of control questions both
online, while participants were performing the vigilance task, and after
completion of the vigilance task. The control questions served to in-
vestigate whether the conditions with and without the additional task
were equivalent in terms of how participants perceived the importance
of the experimental task, how much they concentrated on the task and
the verbal cues presented on the screen, and how important it was for
them to perform the task well. The online questioning procedure was
deliberately brief in order not to interfere with either the main vigilance
task or the stream of consciousness.
2. Study 1
The Research Ethics Committee approved the usage of the modiﬁed
version of the experimental method developed by Schlagman and
Kvavilashvili (2008). Written consent for participation was obtained
prior to data collection.
2.1. Participants
A total of 61 undergraduate students were recruited and randomly
assigned to the two experimental conditions: the cognitive load con-
dition and control condition. They were all screened for depression
using the Polish version of the Beck Depression Inventory (Parnowski &
Jermajczyk, 1977). Six participants who scored 20 or above were ex-
cluded from the sample.3 Therefore, the ﬁnal sample consisted of 30
participants in the cognitive load condition (18 females, Mage = 22.25,
SD= 1.96, range 20–27 years) and 25 participants in the control con-
dition (17 females, Mage = 23.04, SD= 2.36, range 19–32 years). Stu-
dents participated in return for a gift card worth around $5 USD.
3 Since IAMs may be related to various mental disorders, for example depression
(Moulds & Krans, 2015; Watson et al., 2013), we wanted to control for this factor.
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2.2. Materials
2.2.1. Involuntary Memories Program (IMP)
The experiment employed a modiﬁed and fully computerized
method that had been originally developed by Schlagman and
Kvavilashvili (2008). The Involuntary Memories Program (IMP) is de-
scribed elsewhere in more detail (Barzykowski & Niedźwieńska, 2016,
pp. 5–6; also Barzykowski & Staugaard, 2016, p. 524). Brieﬂy, it con-
sists of three main consecutive parts: (1) an introduction that provides
participants with detailed written instructions accompanied by ex-
amples of the line patterns; the introduction consists of two trial ses-
sions, (2) the spontaneous thought reports taken during a main vigi-
lance task, and (3) the autobiographical memory selection during
which participants are asked to decide whether the thoughts that they
reported in part 2 were autobiographical memories.
In general, participants performed a monotonous vigilance task that
involved detecting a pattern of 15 vertical lines in a stream of 785
horizontal lines, with each set of lines presented for 2 s during each
separate trial. Each set consisted of four to ten lines in which two to
eight lines were in a blue colour while the rest were in black. In ad-
dition, short verbal phrases (e.g. riding a bicycle, listening to the radio)
were displayed on each trial in the centre of the screen. The ﬁnal pool of
800 phrases consisted of an approximately equal numbers of carefully
selected neutral (N= 267), positive (N= 267), and negative
(N= 266) phrases.4 There was also a square (approximately 1.5 cm by
1.5 cm) below each phrase with a random number displayed in the
middle (ranging from 1 to 9). The number and colour of the square
changed randomly with each slide (colours used: black, green, blue,
orange).
Participants ﬁrst completed two practice sessions that consisted of
25 cards each. Only one pattern of vertical lines was presented in each
session and verbal phrases were displayed in the same ﬁxed order for
each participant. Following these practice trials, the main vigilance task
began that consisted of 800 cards randomly generated for each parti-
cipant.
2.3. Procedure
Participants were tested in groups of 2 to 6. They were informed
that they were free to withdraw from the study at any point. The ex-
perimenter assured them that their responses would be anonymous and
they could refrain from reporting particularly sensitive thoughts by
typing “X” as an answer, or (if possible) by providing a general de-
scription of their thoughts rather than a detailed account. In order to
minimize intentionality during retrieval (Barzykowski, 2014;
Barzykowski & Niedźwieńska, 2016; Vannucci et al., 2014) and to
maximize involuntary retrieval (Barzykowski & Staugaard, 2016),
participants were instructed to report any spontaneously occurring
thoughts rather than memories only. At the beginning of the session,
the experimenter only brieﬂy introduced the participants to the pro-
cedure. They then started the IMP which provided them with more
detailed instructions.
2.3.1. Control group (only vigilance task)
Participants were instructed to identify a vertical pattern of lines by
pressing a red button (“m” on the keyboard). In addition, they were
informed that they would also see word phrases and a square with a
number in the centre of the screen. It was explained that these addi-
tional stimuli were used in another condition and they would not be
requested to do any task with these stimuli during the current study.
Next, participants were engaged in the ﬁrst practice session that re-
quired responding only to vertical lines. They were then informed that
during the computer task they might experience diﬀerent kinds of
thoughts, and they were provided with examples of such thoughts, in-
cluding personal goals, words, current concerns, plans, and memories.
However, no particular emphasis was put on memories during the
brieﬁng. Participants were only told that memories could be diverse
(i.e., speciﬁc, general) and pertain either to recent or remote past
events. The participants were asked to report any spontaneous thoughts
(regardless of what it was, or how interesting they found it to be) by
pressing the spacebar as soon as they became aware of them. Next, they
performed the second practice session.
After completing the second practice session, participants started
the main vigilance task. Each time they pressed the spacebar, they were
asked to provide a brief description of the content of their thoughts by
typing it into the computer program. They also rated (by ticking the
answer in the program) to what extent they had deliberately tried
bringing the thought to mind (1 = I wasn't trying at all, 2 = I wasn't
trying, 3 = I don't think I tried, 4 = I tried a little bit, 5 = I tried somewhat,
6 = I tried, 7 = I tried very hard).5 This online rating procedure was
deliberately brief in order not to interfere with the main vigilance task.
After completing the questions, participants clicked ‘continue’ to return
to the vigilance task. Halfway through the computer task (after 400
cards), participants had to answer additional control questions by
rating the extent to which they had been concentrating on computer
task as a whole (1 = not concentrating at all, 4 = somewhat con-
centrating, 7 = fully concentrating), the diﬃculty of the computer task as
a whole (1 = not diﬃcult at all, 4 = somehow diﬃcult, 7 = extreme
diﬃcult), and the importance of performing the computer task as well as
they could (1 = not important at all, 4 = somewhat important, 7 = ex-
tremely important). Following this, they returned to the vigilance task.6
At the completion of the vigilance task, participants answered open-
ended questions concerning what they thought was the true goal of the
study. Next they responded to additional manipulation-check questions
by rating the extent to which they had been concentrating on the verbal
phrases (1 = not concentrating at all, 4 = somewhat concentrating,
7 = fully concentrating), the diﬃculty of the computer task (1 = not
diﬃcult at all, 4 = somewhat diﬃcult, 7 = extreme diﬃcult), the im-
portance of performing the computer task as well as they could (1 = not
important at all, 4 = somewhat important, 7 = extremely important), and
their level of fatigue (1 = not tired at all, 4 = somewhat tired, 7 = ex-
tremely tired). They were then provided with written and verbal in-
structions describing the nature of autobiographical memory (as, for
example, in Schlagman, Kliegel, Schulz, & Kvavilashvili, 2009, p. 410)
and informed about the next part of the study. During this part, parti-
cipants reviewed all of their mental contents recorded earlier, one at a
time and in the same order as they had been recorded. Participants
were instructed to decide whether each thought was an auto-
biographical memory or not by clicking the ‘start’ button (if it was) or
the ‘next’ button (if it was not). After clicking the “start” button, they
were asked to describe the memory more thoroughly by typing it into
the computer program. At the completion of the IMP, they ﬁlled in the
Social Desirability Scale (Drwal & Wilczyńska, 1980)7 and the Beck
Depression Inventory (Parnowski & Jermajczyk, 1977).
4 The Polish adaptation of verbal phrases is described in detail elsewhere (Barzykowski
& Niedźwieńska, 2016, p. 6).
5 As it was highlighted elsewhere (e.g. Barzykowski & Niedźwieńska, 2016, pp. 6–7):
“this scale reﬂects participants' conﬁdence in their introspective judgment of eﬀort. So, as
the numbers increase from 3, the participants are less conﬁdent that no eﬀort was in-
volved”.
6 Please note that all participants could rest for a while during the online rating which
limited the risk that after a certain point participants would stop reporting any mental
contents due to tiredness and the task burdensomeness. This may be especially important
in the cognitive load condition that was far more demanding.
7 This way, as it was also done by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008), we wanted to
control for the possibility that participants tried to deliberately recall mental contents to
please the experimenter. This questionnaire consists of 29 items of the „true-false” type.
The reliability coeﬃcients (internal consistency and stability) for the questionnaire
equalled 0.79–0.90. High coeﬃcients of correlation (up to 0.82) with Marlowe-Crowne's
scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) were also obtained (Drwal & Wilczyńska, 1980).
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2.3.2. Cognitive load group (vigilance task + a number-square task)
The only diﬀerence between the cognitive load condition and the
control group was that participants were asked to perform a cogni-
tively-loading parallel task. Every time the square in the centre of the
screen turned green, participants had to decide whether the number in
the centre of the green square was equal to the number of blue lines
(range: 2–8) displayed on the screen. They pressed a green button for
YES (“z” on the keyboard) or a black button for NO (“c”). One hundred
and eighty critical trials with green squares were randomized. They
appeared approximately once every 8 s (i.e. approximately every 4
cards) and featured equal numbers of YES and NO trials.
2.4. Results
For all statistical tests, reported below, the rejection level was set at
0.05 (unless otherwise speciﬁed), and the eﬀect size was measured by
Cohen's d with small, medium, and large eﬀects deﬁned as 0.2, 0.5, and
0.8, respectively (Cohen, 1988). None of the participants reported
having guessed the real purpose of the study.
2.4.1. Equivalence of experimental groups
To test the comparability of experimental groups, the overall par-
ticipants' means for the Social Desirable Scale (SDS), the Beck
Depression Inventory (BDI), the importance of performing the com-
puter task well (both online and retrospective ratings), the fatigue level,
the concentration on the computer task (online ratings) and verbal
phrases (retrospective ratings) were analyzed in a series of independent
t-tests.
As can be seen in Table 1, no diﬀerences were observed between the
two groups on any of these variables. Therefore, we argue that any
possible diﬀerences between groups in the frequency of IAMs should
not be due to group diﬀerences in the level of concentration, motiva-
tion, or fatigue.
2.4.2. Manipulation check
We conducted a series of independent t-tests on the mean ratings of
the immediate and retrospective perception of the task diﬃculty to
investigate whether the experimental manipulation was suﬃcient to
cognitively load the participants. As expected, participants in the cog-
nitive load group rated (online) the computer task as more diﬃcult
(M= 2.88, SD= 0.88) compared to the control condition (M= 1.82,
SD= 0.66), t= 4.61, d= 1.36. The groups did not diﬀer in the ret-
rospective ratings. At the same time, the high level of performance on
the square decision task in the cognitive load group (proportion of
correct responses: M= 0.82, SD= 0.08) suggested that participants
were really absorbed in this additional cognitive task.
Since we observed high performance on the second task and ex-
pected diﬀerences between the groups in how the participants per-
ceived task diﬃculty, it can be reasonably argued that we successfully
manipulated the level of cognitive load (low vs. high) between the
experimental conditions.
2.4.3. Strategy for data analysis
The results of 6 participants who had< 50% of correct responses on
either the vertical lines task or the square decision task were excluded
from further analysis. Two independent judges read all thoughts re-
corded by the participants and assessed which of them were auto-
biographical memories. All entries identiﬁed by the participants as
autobiographical memories were identiﬁed as such by the judges.
However, some of the thoughts indicated as autobiographical memories
by the judges were not identiﬁed as such by the participants.8 There-
fore, re-evaluated entries with an agreement of 100% were included in
the analysis. Such entries (e.g. having romantic dinner and intercourse
with my partner last week, the ﬁrst time I went to scout camp with people
with special needs and disabilities, memory of me having a cycling accident,
memory of my holidays in Egypt etc.) accounted, on average, for 6% of all
mental contents recorded by the participants.
Memories rated from 1 to 3 on the eﬀort scale were considered
involuntary autobiographical memories (Barzykowski & Staugaard,
2016). A rating of 4 (the middle of the scale = some eﬀort) was in-
conclusive and therefore those memories were excluded, together with
all memories that were rated> 4. We calculated the mean number of
involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs), the mean number of
other mental contents reported (non-IAM contents), and the IAMD
index for each participant. IAMD index was the proportion of in-
voluntary autobiographical memories to the total number of all mental
contents reported by a given individual and was calculated as follows:
IAMD= Number of IAMs/(Number of IAMs plus Number of non-IAM
contents).
Participants' values of 2.5 SD or more above or below the mean of
the group on any of the variables were excluded. We conducted a series
of independent t-tests for diﬀerences between groups. In total, we
performed 4 t-tests in each study. To control for multiple comparisons,
we chose the False Discovery Rate correction (Benjamini & Hochberg,
1995). With α= 0.05, the critical value q was 0.38 in Study 1 and 0.50
in Study 2.
2.4.4. Number of non-IAM contents and IAMs
The participants' overall mean number of recorded non-IAM con-
tents and IAMs were entered into a series of independent t-tests (see
Fig. 1). The control group reported more non-IAM contents
Table 1
Means and standard deviations for variables measuring concentration, motivation, fatigue and mood across two groups.
Study 1 Study 2
Group Group
Control Cognitive load Control Cognitive load
M SD M SD t p d M SD M SD t p d
Social Desirable Scale 15.13 4.36 13.70 4.63 1.14 0.259 0.32 13.33 5.16 13.44 4.89 0.07 0.941 0.01
Beck Depression Inventory 8.42 6.19 6.87 4.70 1.05 0.300 0.28 7.68 4.06 6.92 4.78 0.061 0.547 0.01
Concentration on the computer taska 5.09 1.16 5.36 0.99 0.88 0.386 0.25 4.86a 1.01 5.88a 0.82 4.10 < 0.001 1.12
Concentration on verbal phrases 4.87 1.82 4.52 1.53 0.72 0.473 0.21 4.61 1.34 4.50 1.61 0.27 0.791 0.07
Importance of performing the computer task wella 5.23 1.19 4.96 1.24 0.75 0.457 0.22 5.71 0.81 5.96 0.82 1.11 0.271 0.31
Importance of performing the computer task well in
retrospection
5.41 1.02 5.46 1.02 0.16 0.875 0.05 5.29 1.12 5.69 0.97 1.42 0.161 0.38
The level of fatigue 4.78 1.48 4.56 1.36 0.54 0.589 0.15 4.32 1.44 4.15 1.16 0.47 0.641 0.13
Means with the same subscripts are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between columns within the same study.
a Online ratings.
8 Due to the software usage, the decision whether a thought was a memory was irre-
versible which may have resulted in some errors the participants committed in the ca-
tegorization task. In addition, since participants were asked to provide a detailed de-
scription only for memories, they knew that the more memories they had the longer the
experiment would last. As the categorization task was performed at the very end of the
experiment, this may have also aﬀected their decisions at the categorization task.
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(M= 25.83, SD= 18.47) compared to the cognitive load group
(M= 10.68, SD= 9.69), t= 3.51, d= 1.05. Similarly, the control
group reported more IAMs (M= 9.30, SD= 6.46) compared to the
cognitive load group (M= 5.80, SD= 4.95), t= 2.12, d= 0.61.
The number of non-IAM contents and IAMs was not related to
participants' social desirability scores in either control (rnon-IAM con-
tents = 0.03, p= 0.91, rIAMs =−0.18, p= 0.42) or cognitive load
group (rnon-IAM contents = 0.19, p= 0.37, rIAMs = 0.27, p= 0.19).
2.4.5. Involuntary autobiographical memory density index
The overall means of the IAMD index were entered into an in-
dependent t-test (see Fig. 2). The cognitive load group had a higher
IAMD index (M= 0.37, SD= 0.17) compared to the control group
(M= 0.28, SD= 0.12), t= 2.19, d= 0.61.
2.5. Discussion
To verify the presumed cognitive dependency of reporting IAMs, we
provided half the participants with the cognitively-demanding sec-
ondary task. We expected that if reporting IAMs depends on cognitive
load then they should be less frequently observed in the group with the
secondary task compared to the control group. The diﬀerences between
the groups in the number of non-IAM contents and IAMs accorded well
with this expectation. At the same time, the diﬀerences between the
groups in the IAMD index were in opposite direction; namely, IAMs
were proportionally more frequently reported under cognitive load.
3. Study 2
The aim of Study 2 was to replicate the results of Study 1 by en-
gaging participants in an even more cognitively-demanding task than
the task used in Study 1. By doing so we wanted to provide additional
evidence for the hypothesis that cognitive load may modify the fre-
quency of reporting IAMs. We were especially interested in replicating
our new and unexpected ﬁnding from Study 1 that cognitive load in-
creases the relative frequency with which IAMs are reported. We in-
creased the level of the task diﬃculty by doubling the number of the
square-number decisions to be made. We expected to observe the same
pattern of results as in Study 1; namely, a higher number of IAMs and
non-IAM contents in the control group compared to the cognitive load
group and a reversed pattern for the involuntary autobiographical
memory density index, indicating more frequent IAMs in the pool of all
spontaneous mental contents in the cognitive load group compared to
the control group.
3.1. Participants and method
A total of 61 undergraduate students were recruited and randomly
assigned to the two experimental conditions: the cognitive load con-
dition and the control condition. They were all screened for depression
using the Polish version of the Beck Depression Inventory (Parnowski &
Jermajczyk, 1977). Four participants who scored 20 or above were
excluded from the sample. Due to technical diﬃculties, three more
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Fig. 1. The overall means of non-involuntary-autobiographical-
memory contents (non-IAM contents) and involuntary auto-
biographical memories (IAMs) across groups. Error bars indicate 95%





































Fig. 2. The overall means of involuntary autobiographical memory
density index across groups. Error bars indicate 95% conﬁdence in-
tervals for the comparison groups. Please note that IAMD index was
the proportion of involuntary autobiographical memories to the total
number of all mental contents reported by a given individual and was
calculated as follows: IAMD = Number of IAMs/(Number of IAMs
plus Number of non-IAM contents).
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consisted of 26 participants in the cognitive load condition (17 females,
Mage = 21.73, SD= 1.73, range 19–25 years) and 28 participants in the
control condition (18 females, Mage = 21.36, SD= 1.63, range
19–25 years). Students participated in return for course credit.
The procedure was the same as in the Study 1. Participants were
either instructed (the cognitive load condition) or not instructed (the
control condition) to perform the square decision task, in which they
had to decide whether the number in the center of the green square was
equal to the number of blue lines displayed on the screen. The only
diﬀerence between Study 1 and Study 2 was that participants had to
make twice as many decisions compared to Study 1. Three hundred and
sixty critical trials appeared approximately once every 4 s (i.e. ap-
proximately every 2 cards) and featured equal numbers of YES and NO
trials.
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Equivalence of study groups
We investigated the comparability of research groups the same way
as in Study 1. The results presented in Table 1 show that the groups
diﬀered only in terms of concentration on the computer task (online
ratings); namely, participants in the cognitive load group rated their
concentration higher compared to the control group. However, we did
not observe any other diﬀerences between the conditions. Therefore,
we argue that groups were still comparable and any diﬀerences in the
frequency of IAMs could not be explained by reference to the level of
motivation, fatigue, or concentration on verbal phrases.
3.2.2. Manipulation checks
Similarly to Study 1, we compared the level of cognitive load be-
tween the conditions. By doubling the number of the square-number
decisions to be made (compared to Study 1), we intended to increase
the diﬃculty of the secondary task. The results of t-tests showed that
the groups indeed diﬀered signiﬁcantly in this respect. In line with our
expectations, participants in the cognitive group rated the task online as
more diﬃcult (M= 3.00, SD= 1.06) compared to the control group
(M= 1.96, SD= 1.04), t= 3.63, d= 0.99. Similarly, the cognitive
load group rated the task retrospectively as more diﬃcult (M= 3.38,
SD= 1.02) compared to the control group (M= 2.36, SD= 1.13),
t= 3.50, d= 0.96. Similarly to Study 1, the high level of performance
on the square decision task in the cognitive load group (proportion of
correct responses: M= 0.85, SD= 0.11) suggested that participants
were really absorbed by the secondary task.
These results lend support to the notion that our experimental
manipulation was an eﬀective way of engaging participants in the
cognitive activity that increased cognitive load. The eﬀect of experi-
mental manipulation was stronger in Study 2 compared to Study 1 since
the diﬀerences in the perceived task diﬃculty were observed in both
online and retrospective ratings.
3.2.3. Number of non-IAM contents and IAMs
We entered the participants' overall mean number of recorded non-
IAM contents and IAMs into a series of independent t-tests (see Fig. 1).
The control group reported more non-IAM contents (M= 16.35,
SD= 12.83) compared to the cognitive load group (M= 5.16,
SD= 4.10), t= 4.23, d= 1.23. Similarly, the control group reported
more IAMs (M= 6.04, SD= 4.35) compared to the cognitive load
group (M= 3.50, SD= 3.25), t= 2.40, d= 0.67.
The number of non-IAM contents and IAMs was not related to
participants' social desirability scores in either control (rnon-IAM con-
tents =−0.05, p= 0.83, rIAMs = 0.07, p= 0.75) or cognitive load
group (rnon-IAM contents =−0.28, p= 0.22, rIAMs =−0.37, p= 0.10).
3.2.4. Involuntary autobiographical memory density index
We entered the overall means of the IAMD index into an in-
dependent t-test (see Fig. 2). The cognitive load group had higher IAMD
index (M= 0.38, SD= 0.22) compared to the control group
(M= 0.27, SD= 0.13), t= 2.07, d= 0.61.
3.3. Discussion
By providing participants with a more cognitively-demanding task,
we wanted to examine whether the results of Study 1 could be re-
plicated under slightly diﬀerent conditions. We were indeed able to
replicate ﬁndings from Study 1. The pattern of group diﬀerences for the
number of non-IAM contents and IAMs was in line with the cognitive
load dependency view. At the same time, the IAMD index showed that
IAMs were proportionally more frequently experienced under cognitive
load.
4. General discussion
In two experiments, we investigated the eﬀect of cognitive load on
the frequency of reporting IAMs. Participants were divided into two
experimental groups: the control group (low cognitive load) and the
cognitive load group with an additional demanding task. This allowed
us to directly manipulate participants' eﬀort needed to perform the
ongoing task when retrieving IAMs. We calculated the mean number of
IAMs and the mean number of other mental contents (non-IAM con-
tents) provided by each participant, as well as the involuntary auto-
biographical memory density (IAMD) index. The index represents the
proportion of IAMs in a pool of all mental contents reported by the
participant. We hypothesised, in accordance with the cognitive load
dependency view, that the frequency of reporting IAMs, as measured by
both the number and the IAMD index, would decrease as cognitive load
increased.
As expected, the number of non-IAM contents and IAMs was lower
among the cognitively loaded participants compared to the control
group in both experiments. However, the diﬀerences between the
groups in terms of the IAMD index were in the opposite direction.
Unexpectedly, but consistently across the two experiments, IAMs con-
stituted a higher proportion of mental contents recorded by the parti-
cipants in the cognitive load group compared to the control group. Put
diﬀerently, participants indeed reported more IAMs when they were
engaged in an activity with low cognitive resource demands. At the
same time, it was more likely that mental content reported by someone
engaged in a highly-demanding activity was an involuntary auto-
biographical memory.
4.1. Cognitive load dependency of reporting non-IAM contents and IAMs
4.1.1. The number of involuntary autobiographical memories and other
mental contents
Our ﬁnding of a smaller number of IAMs and non-IAM contents in
the cognitive load conditions accords with the literature on mind-
wandering, which shows a decrease of thoughts as cognitive load in-
creases (McKiernan et al., 2006; Singer, 1993). The same pattern was
also observed for the number of IAMs in diary studies (e.g. Berntsen,
1996), and it accords very well with results by Vannucci et al. (2015).
Our results may indicate that the number of non-IAM contents and
IAMs was signiﬁcantly hampered by the parallel task. Importantly,
across both studies cognitive load led to the stronger decrease in the
number of non-IAM contents (Cohen's d1 = 1.03 and d2 = 1.12 for
Study 1 and 2 respectively) compared to the decrease in the number of
IAMs (Cohen's d1 = 0.61 and d2 = 0.67), which may suggest that re-
porting IAMs are less cognitive load-dependent than reporting other
types of spontaneous thoughts. The pattern of results may be related to
the fact that non-IAM thoughts recorded by the participants referred to
all types of mental contents (e.g. semantic knowledge, future thoughts,
thoughts about a current situation) whereas IAMs referred only to self-
relevant contents from the participant's personal past. If the involuntary
retrieval of autobiographical events is more resistant to the eﬀects of
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cognitive load compared to the involuntary retrieval of other types of
information this may suggest that these processes draw on diﬀerent
resources.
It may also be that cognitive load somehow modiﬁes the informa-
tion that is available to consciousness by boosting the likelihood that
IAMs will pass the awareness threshold. For example, cognitively
loaded participants may just notice highly activated contents, whereas
contents with low accessibility and a low level of activation may go
unnoticed (Barzykowski & Niedźwieńska, 2016; Barzykowski &
Staugaard, 2017). As a result, an increase in cognitive demands may
more strongly undermine participants' ability to notice and report
thoughts that are not autobiographical memories, as memories are
more self-relevant and therefore presumably more accessible.
4.1.2. The involuntary autobiographical memory density index
Our ﬁnding of IAMs being proportionally more often reported by
the cognitively loaded participants suggests that cognitive load may
play an important though unexpected role in the formation of IAMs. It
appears that cognitive load does not limit reporting IAMs as much as it
limits reporting non-IAM contents, which suggests that IAMs may be
more automatically retrieved than other spontaneous thoughts.
Actually, a recent study by Plimpton, Patel, and Kvavilashvili (2015)
lends support to the notion that IAMs are more automatic (i.e. less
dependent on cognitive load) and more accessible than other thoughts.
They found that when spontaneous thoughts were recorded by parti-
cipants during a vigilance task, the frequency of IAMs was signiﬁcantly
greater compared to both thoughts about the future and thoughts about
a current situation. Importantly, the last two types of spontaneous
thoughts did not diﬀer from each other in frequency.
4.2. Possible limitations and alternative explanations
We suggest that the pattern of results (i.e. a smaller decrease in the
number of IAMs, compared to non-IAM contents, due to cognitive load
and the higher proportions of IAMs under cognitive load) indicates that
reporting IAMs is less cognitive load-dependent and IAMs are more
accessible than other types of spontaneous thoughts. The question is
whether any aspect of our procedure or results imposes constraints on
this interpretation.
First, it may be suggested that performing a parallel task reduces the
time in which participants may report IAMs during the ongoing task
(Berntsen, 2009, p. 97; for reference to involuntary thoughts see also:
Schooler et al., 2011) and attend to potential cues. This may explain the
reduced number of non-IAM contents and IAMs in the cognitive load
condition compared to the control condition. However, taking this issue
into account, we used the proportion of IAMs in a pool of all thoughts
recorded as a measure of frequency of IAMs and actually found that it
increased from the control condition to the cognitive load condition. It
is rather unlikely that having less time for recording thoughts and at-
tending to cues diﬀerentially inﬂuenced various types of thoughts (e.g.,
having smaller impact on recording autobiographical memories com-
pared to other types of thoughts).
Second, it may be suggested that cognitively loaded participants
intentionally limited their recording of some types of mental contents
more than others. However, it is rather unlikely that participants were
inclined to limit their reports only in respect to some types of mental
content. In both the cognitive load and control condition, participants
were uniformly instructed to write down any kind of mental thought
that would arise during the vigilance task, regardless of what it was, or
how interesting they found it to be. By doing so, we tried to prevent the
participants from using a layperson's deﬁnition of spontaneous mental
contents and to reduce the extent to which they might voluntarily limit
their responses only to some types of memories or thoughts (see also
Barzykowski & Niedźwieńska, 2016).
Third, since our goal was only to examine the presumed cognitive
dependency of reporting IAMs, we decided to use self-caught method.
More importantly, this procedure was also used in studies of Vannucci
et al. (2015), Ball (2007) and naturalistic diary studies. However, as the
self-caught measure relies on meta-awareness, it is unclear whether
cognitive load inﬂuenced the retrieval processes of IAMs (e.g. forming
and developing an involuntary memory) or/and the post-retrieval
processes (e.g. the ability to monitor the ﬂux of awareness for in-
voluntary autobiographical contents). Therefore, it is still not clear
whether the retrieval of IAMs is more resistant to the eﬀects of cogni-
tive load compared to the retrieval of non-IAM contents or whether
IAMs are more salient and hence more likely to be noticed under con-
ditions that challenge the ability to monitor the stream of thoughts.
These issues still need to be addressed in future studies using a probe-
caught method in which participants are randomly stopped during the
vigilance task and asked what was going through their mind at the
exact moment they were stopped (see Plimpton et al., 2015). Compared
to the self-caught method, the probe-caught method substantially di-
minishes requirements for continuous monitoring the ﬂux of awareness
and extracting content of thoughts from the stream. Participants are
prompted to do that only at certain moments. If our results are re-
plicated with the probe-caught method, it would more directly imply
the eﬀect of cognitive load on the retrieval rather than post-retrieval
processes. While our study does not provide this information, it does
not weaken our main ﬁndings which pertain to the frequency of re-
porting IAMs under diﬀerent cognitive load conditions.
Fourth, it can be argued that our results rely on retrospection, i.e.
participants were asked to carry out the thought monitoring process at
the very end of the session. In other words, it may be diﬃcult for
participants to decide retrospectively with great precision whether
thoughts recorded during the vigilance task were or were not about
autobiographical events. However, it was done in the same way in
previous studies (Vannucci et al., 2014), and participants did this
classiﬁcation relatively easily and quickly. Having only short thought
descriptions they did not have any diﬃculties in identifying auto-
biographical memories among their recorded thoughts. In addition, all
entries identiﬁed by participants as memories were coded as such by
independent judges.
Finally, similarly to other studies on IAMs and spontaneous
thoughts (e.g. Barzykowski & Niedźwieńska, 2016, 2017; Barzykowski
& Staugaard, 2016, 2017; Vannucci et al., 2014), there were big var-
iations in the number of spontaneous thoughts that participants re-
ported, i.e. some participants reported many thoughts and others re-
ported very few. This may be caused by the individual diﬀerence
factors, such as susceptibility to fatigue (e.g. McVay & Kane, 2009;
Teasdale et al., 1995), the strength of inhibition processes (e.g.
Verwoerd & Wessel, 2007), memory sensitivity (Cornoldi, De Beni, &
Helstrup, 2007) or even the ability to recognize an involuntary memory
(Mace, Bernas, & Clevinger, 2014). However, it is very unlikely that big
variations in the number of spontaneous thoughts that participants
reported inﬂuenced the pattern of our results. First, the distributions of
the number of IAMs and non-IAM contents did not substantially diﬀer
across the cognitive load and control conditions, except for a shift in
data distribution clearly due to the experimental manipulation. In those
rare cases where the homogeneity of variance assumption was not met,
we used the unequal-variance t-tests. Second, we dichotomised parti-
cipants into those with low and high number of spontaneous thoughts
(according to median value, and also contrasting those from the ﬁrst
and fourth quartile) to investigate whether these groups diﬀered in the
proportion of IAMs reported (the IAMD index). The IAMD indexes were
entered into a series of 2 Condition (cognitive load vs. control) × 2
Group (high number vs. low number of spontaneous thoughts) factorial
analyses of variance (ANOVAs). We did not ﬁnd any eﬀect of Group,
either alone or in interaction with Condition, in any of the experiments,
all ps > 0.14.
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4.3. Final conclusions
Consistently across two experiments, and in contrast to our ex-
pectations, involuntary autobiographical memories were relatively
more often reported and constituted a higher proportion of mental
contents under high cognitive load. This may suggest that reporting
IAMs is less cognitive load-dependent than reporting other spontaneous
thoughts. Our ﬁndings are based on the use of involuntary auto-
biographical memory density index which seems to be an eﬃcient
measure of cognitive load-induced eﬀects on involuntary auto-
biographical memories, especially when the dual-task paradigm is
adopted to manipulate cognitive load.
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